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1.0 INTRODUCTION   
Many commentators assume that the WTO Doha Round negotiations have 
already failed and that this failure will not matter for Canadian agriculture. Neither 
view is correct. Most countries appear willing to make the effort needed to bring 
the negotiations to a make or break point in early 2008. If the Doha Round does 
eventually fail, an important opportunity to make the agricultural trading system 
significantly less distorted, more open and fair will have been lost.
1 For Canadian 
agriculture, the failure to move the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) forward 
has more serious consequences than just missing the chance to improve the 
rules governing agricultural trade; it could signal a return to increased 
protectionism, more managed trade, a return to competitive subsidization, and an 
escalation in the number of trade disputes. 
It has been more than six years since the Doha Round was launched. During that 
period, the negotiations have staggered from crisis to crisis and yet, despite 
numerous missed deadlines, the main elements of a potential deal in agriculture 
have slowly emerged. While a number of participants and observers are still 
convinced that a deal is within reach, others are increasingly pessimistic that 
there is the necessary political will to conclude the negotiations in 2008. They 
believe that elections in the US and India will result in a lengthy suspension of the 
negotiations at best, or a complete breakdown at worst. Compounding the 
negotiating difficulties is the fact that the US Administration currently does not 
have Congressional "fast track" Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). This means 
that if a deal is struck in Geneva in the near future, the other participants run the 
risk of "double jeopardy"; that is, they could end up having to renegotiate the deal 
with Congress in order to obtain a Doha specific TPA which would oblige 
Congress to vote on a Doha implementing bill on an up-or-down basis, without 
amendments.
2 
Some pessimists go on to argue that the real question now is whether what has 
been tentatively agreed to, can be frozen  
until a new US Administration is capable 
of re-engaging and concluding the 
negotiations (probably in 2011 at the 
earliest). If the answer to this question is 
“no,” then the Doha negotiations will have 
failed and the opportunity to continue and 
intensify the reform of world agricultural  
trade, which took its first halting steps in the Uruguay Round, will have slipped 
through our fingers. 
                                            
1 Appendix I discusses why it has been so hard to successfully conclude the Doha Round. 
2 Some observers believe that a Democratic controlled Congress is less likely to block a Doha 
Round specific request than a request for broader negotiating authority, including bilateral trade 
deals. 
If the Doha Round negotiations are 
not completed during 2008, a new 
US Administration will not be able to 
re-engage and conclude them any 
earlier than 2011.   3
Some question whether the WTO matters now that world agriculture is in the 
midst of a biofuel boom and the underlying market fundamentals for many 
commodities are strong. However, similar comments were made in the early 
1970s. Experience suggests that in agriculture, it is wise to assume a production 
response to high prices and that price troughs will continue to follow price peaks. 
In addition, cost/price squeezes could become more severe in the future if energy 
and fertilizer costs continue to rise. To the extent that biofuel policies result in 
continuing strength in grain and oilseed prices, the livestock sector will be made 
more vulnerable to price downturns and hence more likely than in the past to 
seek government assistance. When prices weaken and costs continue to rise, 
governments will be under pressure to increase domestic support, and to find 
ways to provide additional import protection/export assistance. International 
commitments provide a shield to fend off such pressures and/or the incentive to 
provide support in less trade-distorting ways. 
Some suggest that the benefits of multilateral trade liberalization have often been 
overestimated and the political and financial challenges of helping the "losers" to 
adjust underestimated. Even if these assessments are correct, is there also a 
tendency for the consequences of a Doha Round failure to be overstated? A 
“yes” answer could be based on the  
analysis of scenarios involving more trade 
liberalization than will actually materialize, 
and a “no” answer on scenarios that 
ignore services trade liberalization, the 
creation of new investment opportunities 
and the dynamic gains from trade. While 
overstatement is always a risk, it should 
be noted that a Doha Round failure would 
mark the first time a multilateral trade negotiation has failed to conclude and it 
would represent the worst set back for the multilateral trading system since the 
US Congress failed to ratify a proposed International Trade Organization in the 
late 1940s. 
Few nations are more trade dependent than Canada and multilateral agricultural 
trade reform is vitally important for the Canadian agrifood sector, given that its 
productive capacity far exceeds its relatively small domestic market. As Figure 1 
illustrates there is a very close correlation between Canada’s farm cash receipts 
and its export performance. In recent years, agrifood exports have averaged 70 
to 75 percent of farm cash receipts and exceeded imports by around $5 billion 
per year.   
Experience has shown that preferential trade agreements such as NAFTA, while 
capable of very substantial market access improvements, are incapable of 
disciplining domestic support and export subsidies. For this to occur, all the major  
A Doha Round failure would mark 
the first time a multilateral trade 
negotiation has failed to conclude 
and would represent the worst set 
back for the multilateral trading 
system since the late 1940s.   4
subsidizers and beneficiaries need to be around the same table, which means a 
multilateral negotiation is necessary to achieve this rather than a bilateral or 
regional agreement.
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As a major agricultural exporter and importer (table 1), Canada has a vested 
interest in the WTO continuing to strengthen its trade rules and disciplines, by 
providing a forum to further reduce or eliminate trade distorting support and 
protection. Successive rounds of GATT negotiations failed to deal with agriculture 
in any meaningful way until the trade situation became so corrosive that countries 
decided in the Uruguay Round that a start had to be made in bringing agricultural 
trade under the rule of law. While the Uruguay Round was successful in 
eliminating country-specific exceptions, reducing export subsidies, converting 
non-tariff barriers into bound tariffs, and laying the foundation to significantly 
reduce trade-distorting domestic support in future negotiations; it did not make 
much progress in improving market access. In fact, world agricultural tariffs still 
average over 60 percent, as compared to less than 30 percent for non-
agricultural tariffs (less than five percent in developed countries).   5
 
Table 1: Canada's Imports and Exports of Goods, by Product, 2006 
 
Product Exports  Imports  Balance  of 
Trade 




percent billions  of 
$ 
Agrifood Products  27.9  6.1  22.4  5.5  5.5 
Energy  Products  86.8 19.0 34.6  8.6  52.2 
Forestry Products  33.3  7.3  3.1  0.8  30.2 
Industrial Goods & Materials  94.0  20.6  84.0  20.8  10.0 
Machinery & Equipment  94.7 20.8  114.6  28.3 -20.0 
Automotive  Products  82.5 18.1 79.8 19.7  2.8 
Other Consumer Goods  18.0 3.9 52.0  12.9 -34.1 
Other Goods  18.6  4.1 13.8 3.5  4.8 
Total  455.7 100.0 404.4 100.0  51.3 
In order to explore the consequences for Canadian agriculture of a worst case 
scenario, this paper assumes that the Doha Round negotiations will fail to 
conclude in 2008 and that no resumption of substantive negotiations will be 
scheduled. We begin by examining the implications for the global agricultural 
trading system of failure. Following this, we discuss the general consequences of 
failure for the Canadian agrifood sector and then examine the implications for 
export oriented and import sensitive industries. We then outline the potential 
benefits of a positive Doha Round result and contrast this with the options 
Canada will face with a breakdown of the multilateral negotiations. 
 
2.0   DOES A DOHA ROUND FAILURE REALLY MATTER? 
There are two main scenarios for the international trading system following a 
Doha failure and no planned resumption of negotiations. The first scenario is that 
a progressive deterioration in the trading system will be so intolerable; it will 
stimulate countries to start a new round of multilateral trade negotiations within 
the next three to four years. The second scenario is a death spiral wherein the 
multilateral trading system begins to unravel and world trade becomes 
increasingly governed by a growing number of competing preferential trading 
blocs. The longer the delay in resuming the multilateral trade negotiations, the 
greater will be the risk of a complete breakdown of the entire system. Some 
observers believe that before the multilateral trading system implodes, countries 
will recognize the dangers and return to the multilateral table, probably with a 
broader agenda than under the Doha Round. Others are not so sanguine.   6
If implosion of the multilateral trading system is not permitted, then the two 
scenarios merge into one with the main difference being the amount of time it 
takes for countries to recognize that the trading system cannot be allowed to 
regress indefinitely. However, if the more pessimistic observers are correct and 
the multilateral trading system slowly disintegrates, Canadian agriculture will 
become more than ever dependent on NAFTA and vulnerable to preferential 
access competition in an increasing number of offshore markets.
3 As the 
multilateral system erodes, increased uncertainty would negatively impact 
investment in and the growth of the Canadian agrifood economy. 
For developed and developing country agricultural exporters, a Doha Round 
result on agriculture along the  
lines proposed in the Chair's 
modalities paper would 
represent incremental but 
worthwhile progress towards 
the goal of a more open and 
less distorted multilateral 
trading system. It would 
quicken, reinforce, and 
strengthen a number of trends which are already determining the future of global 
agriculture. For example, demand for food in most developed countries is 
saturated. Consumers are demanding more and more value added in terms of 
convenience but the physical quantity of food consumed is not increasing and in 
fact, could decline with the impact of low birth rates and an aging population. In 
contrast, the demand for food will increase substantially in developing countries, 
particularly those with large numbers of young, increasingly affluent consumers, 
who as incomes increase, are upgrading their diets to include more protein, fresh 
fruits and vegetables, and high-value prepared foods.  
Some argue that growing import demand in developing countries will continue to 
drive international markets, irrespective of a Doha Round result. This is true, but 
the question for exporters such as Canada, is whether it makes sense to make 
the investments necessary to gear up to service export markets where the 
applied tariff is well below the bound rate and can be unilaterally increased 
overnight. Moreover, it must be remembered that agricultural imports in 
developing countries will depend on their economic growth and for many this will 
be export led, sometimes in manufacturing, sometimes in agriculture, and 
sometimes in both. The lack of a Doha Round result will lower the rate of 
economic growth in many emerging markets, and this in turn will lead to lower 
agricultural import demand. 
While there are a number of examples of unilateral reforms of domestic 
agricultural policies, there is no doubt that new international rights and obligations 
                                            
3 Preferential access competition involves other countries having access to foreign markets at 
lower tariffs than Canada.  
For developed and developing country 
agricultural exporters, a Doha Round 
result on agriculture would represent 
incremental but worthwhile progress 
towards the goal of a more open and 
less distorted multilateral trading system.  7
will help facilitate policy reform and lock in past unilateral reforms which might 
otherwise erode in the face of a market downturn. For example, in Canada, the 
Uruguay Round disciplines on export subsidies helped reinforce the arguments of 
those pressing for the elimination of grain transportation subsidies. A Doha 
Round result would provide similar opportunities for policy-makers around the 
world. 
Although we find the arguments for completing the Doha Round compelling, 
there is no guarantee that sensible heads will ultimately prevail in preventing the 
multilateral system from unraveling. If it does unravel, what would be the main 
consequences of a Doha Round failure for Canadian agriculture? The likely 
responses are discussed in detail in the next section but briefly they would entail: 
1) increased trade diversion arising from a further proliferation of PTAs; 2) an 
overburdened dispute settlement system; 3) more pressure to use sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and other technical regulations as disguised barriers to 
trade; and 4) reduced pressure for domestic policy reform.   
 
3.0  CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CANADIAN AGRIFOOD SECTOR 
Canada's next generation of domestic agricultural policies is currently under 
federal/provincial consideration. Any review will need to consider how the 
external environment is likely to change over the next decade and to what extent 
the environment will differ if the Doha Round succeeds or fails. In this section, we 
consider four adverse trends that could gain momentum in the absence of a 
successful Doha Round. 
More Preferential Trade Agreements 
The number of preferential trading agreements has increased significantly since 
the turn of the century and this trend will likely continue regardless of whether the 
Doha Round succeeds or fails. The proliferation of PTAs can be attributed to a 
variety of economic and geopolitical factors (e.g., the breakup of the former 
Soviet Union). Earlier in the Doha Round, some countries (most notably the US) 
used the negotiation of PTAs as a "stick" to encourage the conclusion of an 
ambitious multilateral result. More recently, the perception that the Doha Round 
negotiations are in serious difficulty and could ultimately fail has led other 
countries to regard PTAs more favourably. Whether for offensive or defensive 
reasons, as a "Plan A" priority, or "Plan B" fallback; one can expect there will be 
greater pressure on governments to pursue PTA negotiations following a failure 
of the Doha Round.    8
A substantial Doha Round result on tariffs would reduce the preference margins 
of existing or new PTAs and moderate to some extent the pressure for regional 
accords. A Doha Round  
failure leaves Canada 
more vulnerable to being 
placed at a competitive 
disadvantage, as other 
agricultural exporters 
seek to improve market 
access opportunities 
through negotiation of 
bilateral or plurilateral free trade agreements. Currently, Australia is negotiating 
with China, the US already has trade agreements in North Africa (Morocco), 
MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) will resume PTA 
negotiations with the EU, and the EU will continue to negotiate reciprocal trade 
agreements with the former colonies of its member states and to expand 
membership of its customs union. 
Even though agriculture will contain a number of exceptions from tariff elimination 
in most PTAs, the bottom line is that for specific commodities, Canada's 
competitors will have preferential access, whether this means Australian grains 
and meat into China, grains, oilseed products, and meat from MERCOSUR into 
the EU, or processed food exports from the EU into India. 
Table 2: Major Destinations and Sources of Canadian Trade, 2006 
 
Country or Region  % of total merchandise 
trade 
% of total agrifood 
trade 
 Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
United States  81.6  54.9  58.2  58.3 
European Union-25  6.6 12.4  6.5  13.9 
Japan 2.1  3.9  8.5  0.2 
China 1.7  8.7  2.4  1.9 
Mexico 1.0  4.0  3.9  3.8 
Korea 0.7  1.5  1.6  0.1 
Total for six countries  93.7  85.4  81.1  78.2 
Other 6.3  14.6  18.9  21.8 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Canada's natural resource industries, including agriculture, are particularly 
vulnerable to being put at a competitive disadvantage in a world of proliferating 
PTAs. This is because non-NAFTA markets account for a much larger share of 
total exports for the natural resource sectors than for the other sectors of the 
Canadian economy (table 2). 
Doha Round failure leaves Canada more 
vulnerable to being placed at a competitive 
disadvantage, as other agricultural exporters 
seek to improve market access opportunities 
through the negotiation of bilateral or 
plurilateral free trade agreements.   9
Non-NAFTA markets have the growth potential to reduce Canada's vulnerability 
of being so reliant on a single export market, namely, the US. The US takes over 
80 percent of Canada's total merchandise exports and even in agriculture the US 
market represents nearly 60 percent of total Canadian exports (table 2). 
Capitalizing on offshore market growth potential offers considerable market 
diversification benefits which will be eroded if PTAs favour competitors at 
Canada's expense. 
Canada has already indicated that it intends to pursue PTAs in Latin America, 
with CARICOM, and with Korea in order to compete more effectively in markets 
where the US already has or hopes to have preferential access. However, with 
the exception of Korea, these are relatively small markets compared to the EU, 
China, or India. While the US may be unable to pursue new PTAs for some time 
because of a lack of fast track negotiating authority (which a Democratic 
Congress is less likely to provide, at least for PTAs), there is nothing constraining 
the EU, MERCOSUR, or other exporters from pursuing PTAs. 
While Canada can try and match the PTA activities of others, it takes two to 
tango and there is no guarantee that the Canadian market will be viewed as 
sufficiently attractive to capture the interests of the larger, prospective PTA 
partners, who can pick and choose among a number of potential suitors and 
must prioritize where to use their  
negotiating capital. Unfortunately, 
Canada is big enough to cause import 
competition concerns in other 
countries when it comes to agriculture 
and other natural resource sectors, 
but may not be regarded as a 
particularly high priority export market  
from the perspective of many of its larger non-NAFTA trading partners. 
Thus, from a Canadian perspective, it would be better to be part of a large, 
plurilateral initiative, such as an Asia Pacific PTA than to try to compete by 
negotiating a series of bilateral PTAs which import sensitive sectors have a 
greater chance of blocking. Like a multilateral agreement, but obviously to a 
lesser extent, a very large plurilateral PTA would tend to reduce the risk of trade 
diversion for Canada. 
One of the major attributes of a multilateral negotiation for medium and small 
countries is that it enables them to take advantage of the negotiating leverage of 
much larger players such as the US and the EU. Thus, in agriculture, Canada 
benefits from the priority the US, the G-20, and the Cairns Group attach to 
expanding market access. In the case of domestic support, Canada benefits from 
the priority the EU and the G-20 attach to reducing US trade-distorting domestic 
support to the maximum extent possible. Similarly, multilateral negotiations 
provide the opportunity to become part of various negotiating groups, such as the 
There is no guarantee that the 
Canadian market will be viewed as 
sufficiently attractive to capture the 
interests of any larger, prospective 
PTA partners.   10
G-20 and the Cairns Group, which also helps to maximize a smaller country's 
negotiating leverage.  
Outside of a multilateral 
or a very large 
plurilateral negotiation, 
Canada will have few 
opportunities to avail 
itself of this "coattail" 
effect when dealing with 
prospective preferential 
trading partners who have similar or larger negotiating leverage. As a 
consequence, it can be expected that most of Canada's prospective preferential 
trading partners will continue to be smaller rather than larger markets. 
More Litigation in Agrifood Trade 
If the Doha Round fails, the multilateral agricultural trading system will continue to 
operate under the existing rules and disciplines of the WTO, and in particular, the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. One of the major accomplishments of 
the Uruguay Round was the establishment of a much improved dispute 
settlement system. Under the GATT, panels were prevented from being 
established or the results were blocked from being adopted because of the 
requirement for consensus on every decision. Under the WTO, countries have a 
right to a panel and the defending country cannot block the adoption of a dispute 
settlement finding. 
If the Doha Round fails, countries can be expected to try and get through 
litigation, what they could not get through negotiation. Increased recourse to 
WTO litigation runs the risk that at some point the dispute settlement system may 
begin to buckle under the pressure as governments become tired of losing panel 
cases and become more willing to ignore negative panel findings.  
Unfortunately, while the existing WTO dispute settlement system provides for 
authorized retaliation if a country refuses to bring its measures into conformity 
with a Panel/Appellate Body finding, it is impossible for a smaller country to 
retaliate without hurting either industries dependent on imported inputs or 
consumers. Thus, smaller countries would much prefer the implementation of 
dispute settlement findings.  
In short, it is asking too much to expect the existing dispute settlement system to 
indefinitely shoulder the burden of failed negotiations. Moreover, pressure on 
governments to use trade remedies (anti-dumping and countervailing duties and 
emergency import safeguards) will increase as protectionist pressures are 
encouraged by the vacuum in the multilateral negotiations. Agriculture is 
particularly vulnerable to the use of constructed costs of production to determine 
"normal value" in dumping cases, because it is generally a price taker and often 
In agriculture, Canada benefits from the priority 
the US, the G-20, and the Cairns Group attach 
to expanding market access. In the case of 
domestic support, Canada benefits from the 
priority the EU and the G-20 attach to reducing 
US trade-distorting domestic support.   11
does not cover the full costs of production, including normal profit, when market 
prices fall as a result of cyclical or weather related events. While the Doha Round 
is not expected to result in major changes in anti-dumping rules, largely because 
of the strong opposition of US steel, textile, and clothing interests, some 
improved disciplines to prevent abuse are expected, since many WTO members 
attach importance to reform in this area. 
A Doha Round failure will encourage exporting countries to make every effort to 
protect their existing export market access. Thus, for example, a Canadian 
decision to change the compositional standards for cheese in order to minimize 
the use of imported, non-traditional dairy ingredients could result in a WTO tariff 
nullification and impairment challenge under Article II of the GATT and/or under 
the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. This would particularly be the 
case if foreign access to Canada's milk protein market is also curtailed as a result 
of an Article XXVIII renegotiation. 
Experience has demonstrated that Canadian agriculture is particularly vulnerable 
to US trade remedy actions, 
especially anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties. 
In an environment of  
increasing trade tensions 
following a failure of the 
Doha Round, there would 
be an increased risk of  
such actions.  
More Abuse of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Trade 
Barriers  
A failure of the Doha Round might encourage and reinforce a variety of 
protectionist pressures, particularly in the area of technical regulations. One of 
the major accomplishments of the Uruguay Round was the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) which encouraged 
governments to base their SPS regulations on science and discouraged their use 
as disguised barriers to trade. With the major exception of the EU meat hormone 
case (which reflected a political reaction to consumer perceptions, as well as 
protectionist pressures), the WTO dispute settlement system has been very 
successful in policing and enhancing the credibility of the SPS Agreement. 
The SPS Agreement is not under negotiation in the Doha Round and by and 
large, it has provided administrators with an effective shield against pressures to 
use SPS measures for protectionist rather than legitimate science-based 
reasons. However, to the extent the overall credibility of the WTO will be 
undermined by a failure of the Doha Round, there will be an increased risk that 
Canadian agriculture is particularly 
vulnerable to US trade remedy actions and 
in the environment of increasing trade 
tensions following a failure of the Doha 
Round, there would be an increased risk of 
such actions.    12
the SPS Agreement’s shield will be unable to deflect as many protectionist 
pressures as it was able to do in the past.  
To the extent that a Doha Round failure will erode the credibility of the SPS and 
TBT Agreements, Canadian agricultural exports will be adversely affected such 
as, beef and seed potatoes which have a history of SPS problems and are 
vulnerable to a return to arbitrary "better safe than sorry" SPS decisions as 
opposed to those based on science and risk assessments. 
Canada has benefited from the SPS Agreement immeasurably, particularly in the 
way it has influenced the  
US response to the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE or "mad cow") cases in 
Canada. So far, despite 
intense pressure to close the 
cattle and beef border for as 
long as possible and for as 
many products as possible, 
the US has insisted on 
making decisions on import 
entry on a scientific basis. A Doha Round failure will run the risk of tipping the 
scales back in favour of those who want to use technical regulations for 
protectionist reasons. 
More Domestic Policy Reform Challenges 
While many in Europe claim that reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
is irreversible, others argue that a failure of Doha would have a negative effect on 
efforts to continue to reform the dairy sector which has so far only been lightly 
touched. Certainly, if there are no commitments to phase-out export subsidies, 
the EU Commission will be under pressure to continue to use their WTO export 
subsidy entitlements in depressed market conditions (as witnessed by the recent 
reintroduction of EU export subsidies on pork) or to compensate processors for 
inadequate domestic reforms. That said, many observers argue that the EU is 
less likely to backslide than the countries of North America which have not 
undertaken anywhere near the same degree of reform (although arguably 
starting from a much lower base than Europe and involving fewer commodity 
sectors). 
The reality is that governments in North America are not facing the same degree 
of budgetary pressures as in the European Union, which must recognize that the 
CAP of the 1960s with just six member states is simply not sustainable in the 
current EU of 27 members and growing. However, in the EU, the politics of 
agriculture are somewhat easier to manage as compared to North America, 
Canada has benefited from the SPS 
Agreement immeasurably, particularly in 
the way it has influenced the US response 
to the mad cow cases in Canada. So far, 
despite intense pressure to close the 
border for as long as possible, the US has 
insisted on making its decisions on a 
scientific basis.    13
because an individual member state negatively affected by reform can blame the 
majority in the EU and/or the unelected  
European Commission for its inability to 
respond to domestic pressures to retain 
the policy status quo. In North America, 
there is no supra-national body to blame 
and therefore elected politicians in each 
country are more exposed to the 
political backlash arising from farm 
policy reform, particularly where it 
involves threats to asset values created by the existing programs. Thus, 
unilateral reform is arguably more difficult in North America and helps to explain 
why reform of commodity price support policies is more dependent on external 
pressure than it is in the EU.  
Canada's ability to unilaterally reform domestic agricultural policies is probably 
more constrained than in the US because agriculture is a shared responsibility 
under the Constitution and, unlike most other federal states, Canadian provinces 
have a long history of operating their own price and income support policies. In 
order to minimize the potential for policy conflict and incoherence, the federal and 
provincial governments have developed a number of jointly funded national 
agricultural income support programs. While these income support programs 
have undergone a number of changes over the years (e.g., the switch to whole 
farm rather than commodity specific programs), there have been comparatively 
fewer changes made to the national supply management systems which have 
been in place since the 1960s for dairy and the 1970s for poultry and eggs – 
systems which in addition to federal import protection, rely heavily on the 
delegation of federal and provincial powers to provincial and/or national 
marketing boards (e.g., taxation, production quotas, and inter-provincial trade 
controls). Although the Uruguay Round resulted in the conversion of quantitative 
import restrictions into two-stage tariffs (tariff rate quotas), the resulting over-
quota tariffs were high enough to permit the value of production quotas to nearly 
quadruple since the end of the Uruguay Round to $26.2 billion in 2006 (Statistics 
Canada). 
To date there has been only sporadic and limited internal pressure (mainly from 
processors and institutional users) to adapt supply management to an 
international agricultural trading system which is becoming progressively more 
open. Most other stakeholders have been either ambivalent or strongly opposed 
to any changes to an income support system which does not rely on taxpayer 
support (although in recent years there have been efforts by some provincial 
marketing boards to limit the escalation in production quota values). 
Given the politics of Canadian agriculture, it is no accident that the greatest 
reforms of Canada's agricultural policies during the post-WWII period – the 
development of "whole farm" income support (as opposed to commodity-specific 
In North America, there is no 
supra-national body to blame and 
therefore elected politicians in 
each country are more exposed 
to the political backlash arising 
from farm policy reform.   14
price support) and the elimination of grain transportation subsidies – were both 
precipitated by external pressures. In the case of using income support rather 
than price support for most commodities, the pressure came from US 
countervailing duty action in the late 1980s against commodity price supports (in 
particular, for live hogs and pork). In the case of the transportation subsidies, the 
need to implement the Uruguay Round export subsidy commitments helped 
break the long-standing impasse between the defenders of the status quo and 
those who believed the subsidies were discouraging livestock and other value-
added production in Western Canada. 
The main consequences of a Doha Round failure for Canadian agricultural 
policy-makers would be a  
substantial reduction in external 
pressures to adapt Canada's 
existing agricultural policies so 
they would be sustainable in a 
more open and less distorted 
trading environment. If one 
accepts that a Doha Round  
failure would precipitate 
protectionist pressures which 
eventually would drive countries 
to resume multilateral  
negotiations, and that the long-term trend of the international trading system will 
be a continued reduction of trade barriers, then it would be dangerous for 
Canadian agricultural policy-makers to assume otherwise when considering 
domestic policy changes in either a medium or longer-term context. 
There is no doubt that only a substantial multilateral trade agreement would 
provide the necessary pressure to force change on the 20 percent of Canadian 
agriculture based on supply management.
4  Of course a one-quarter reduction in 
200-300 percent over-quota tariffs would not mean the end of supply 
management, nor would a doubling or tripling of the quantity of imports allowed in 
at low tariffs.
5 
For the 80 percent of Canadian agriculture based on international market prices, 
a failed Doha Round would reduce the pressures to change federal and 
provincial policies which are categorized as trade-distorting (i.e., non-green). 
Because of the large gap between Canada's actual non-green support levels and 
its Uruguay Round commitments, there was, for a number of years, little pressure 
on policy-makers to design domestic support policies to exactly meet the WTO 
                                            
4 Although supply managed commodities account for about 20 percent of farm cash receipts, they 
account for only ten percent of farm operators.  In 2006, Canada had 327,055 farm operators, 
25,770 engaged in dairy production and 6,770 in poultry and egg production. 
5 Appendix II contains a detailed analysis of why a modified supply management system could 
co-exist with the prospective Doha Round results. 
One of the main consequences of a 
Doha Round failure for Canadian 
agricultural policy-makers would be a 
substantial reduction in external 
pressures to adapt Canada's existing 
agricultural policies so they would be 
sustainable in a more open and less 
distorted trading environment.    15
definitions of a green program. However, in more recent years, mainly as a result 
of weak grain and oilseed markets and the effects of BSE, Canada's non-green 
support levels have increased significantly and a 60 percent reduction as 
envisaged in the Doha Round would force federal and provincial governments to 
more explicitly tailor the design of their policies to meet the green criteria. 
Canadian policy-makers are frequently under political pressure to compensate 
producers for distortions caused by other countries’ domestic agricultural policies. 
In recent years, the focus has been on the support policies of the US, which are, 
on average, lower than that of Canada but are concentrated in fewer sectors, 
particularly grains and oilseeds. The absence of a Doha Round result would 
certainly encourage Canadian grain and oilseed producers to continue to press 
for financial "compensation" for higher US support programs (and has already 
been obtained in some provinces). Conversely, a Doha Round result which 
reduced the US aggregate measurement of support from US$19.1 billion to 
US$7.6 billion and put a ceiling of around US$13 billion on all forms of trade 
distorting support, would have the effect of constraining US non-green support in 
future market downturns. 
A positive Doha Round conclusion would at a minimum result in the phase out of 
federal financial guarantees to the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) in line with the 
phase out of export subsidies. It is still not clear whether a Doha Round result 
would also include the phase out of the export monopoly powers of developed 
country export state trading enterprises. Certainly, the pressure to do this would 
increase in line with the size of the overall agricultural package and the US (with 
the support of the EU) can be expected to press hard on this issue. However, 
even without a Doha Round result the future of the export monopoly powers of 
the CWB is problematic given the current government's promise to provide 
"marketing choice" for Canada's wheat and barley producers. 
In sections 4.0 and 5.0, we turn to issues of particular importance to Canada’s 
agrifood exporters and Canada’s supply managed industries. 
 
4.0  CANADIAN EXPORT INTERESTS 
It is often argued that import sensitive sectors are more effective in lobbying 
against trade liberalization than export interests are in identifying the benefits of 
liberalization because the gains are diffuse and the losses are concentrated and 
visible. However, in the case of Canadian agriculture, the losses to agricultural 
exporters of a failed Doha Round are more concrete and visible than for most of 
the economy. In broad terms the consequences for Canadian exporters include: 
1) the loss of improved market access opportunities; 2) a missed opportunity to 
substantially reduce trade distorting support and eliminate or discipline export   16
assistance; and 3) retrogression and increased strain on the international trading 
system. These issues are discussed in more detail below. 
Loss of Improved Market Access Opportunities 
In terms of market access, failure of the Doha Round might result in slower 
growth in import demand, particularly in export-led (agricultural and non-
agricultural) developing country economies which would have implications for 
Canadian agrifood producers. Such a failure would also mean that the proposed 
reductions in bound agricultural tariffs of around 50 percent for developed 
markets and 33 percent in the more advanced developing country markets would 
not take place. Also, there would be no doubling or tripling of tariff rate quota 
volumes subject to (reduced) lower tariffs, mainly in developed country import 
markets (e.g., pork and malt in the EU). There would be a loss of the positive 
result in trade facilitation negotiations which would have reduced red tape and 
transaction costs associated with imports. There would also be no new 
disciplines on trade remedies, particularly anti-dumping duties, which are being 
increasingly used by developing as well as developed country importers to 
protect their domestic markets. Failure would also imply no reductions in the gap 
between applied and bound tariffs with the risk that applied tariffs could be 
unilaterally increased.  
The failure of the Doha Round would mean forgoing a major opportunity to 
further diversify Canada's  
agricultural export profile in 
terms of commodities and 
markets. The majority of 
Canada's bulk commodity 
exports go to non-NAFTA 
markets. A significant reduction 
in tariffs on further processed 
products in these markets 
would tend to encourage the 
export of more value-added 
products. Export expansion to 
non-NAFTA markets would also  
tend to reduce Canada’s heavy export dependence on the US.  
The reason why Canada's export performance in the US (and Mexico) has been 
so strong and diversified has been the duty free access we enjoy for almost all of 
our exports. The dramatic increase in Canada's exports of processed potatoes to 
the US is a classic example of how improved access can result in increased 
investment and production of a value-added product for export. The reason why 
Canada's performance in most offshore markets has been weak, in comparison, 
is the continued existence of high tariffs and tariff escalation. It is not luck that 
Canada's best non-NAFTA export performance is in China – a country whose 
Failure of the Doha Round would mean 
forgoing the opportunity to diversify 
Canada's agricultural export profile. 
Significant reductions in tariffs on 
processed products would encourage 
exports of more value-added goods and 
expanding exports to other markets 
would reduce Canada’s heavy export 
dependence on the US market.   17
agricultural tariffs were significantly reduced as a result of its accession to the 
WTO. 
A Missed Opportunity to Substantially Reduce Trade Distorting Support 
and Eliminate or Discipline Export Assistance 
Failure of the Doha Round will mean continued access to Uruguay Round export 
subsidy entitlements by Canada’s competitors, particularly the EU. Also, there 
will be no new disciplines on food aid and export credit programs, particularly 
those of the US; no new reduction commitments on total trade distorting domestic 
support, particularly, the US and EU; and no commodity-specific caps on non-
green support, particularly for US grains and oilseeds. No Doha Round deal 
means that there will be no international pressure to reform domestic agricultural 
policies in developed and developing country markets which would encourage a 
shift to more trade friendly policies. There will be no new disciplines on domestic 
support and other notification requirements (e.g., preferential trade agreements) 
to increase transparency. 
The recent versions of the 2008 US Farm Bill passed by the House and Senate 
indicate that in the absence of any new multilateral commitment, the US 
Congress will enact new farm legislation that differs little from the retrogressive 
2002 US Farm Bill. The only saving grace will be that Congressional leaders 
have made it clear that US legislation will be amended as necessary to bring it 
into conformity if there is a Doha Round result. 
Retrogression and Increased Strain on the International Trading System 
If the Doha Round fails, Canadian agrifood exporters will also see no reduction in 
international price volatility and no upward price pressure as a result of the 
combined effects of: 1) elimination of export subsidies, disciplines on food aid 
and export credits; 2) reduction in trade-distorting domestic support; and 3) a 
substantial increase in market access opportunities, the largest improvements 
coming in the most distorted markets,(e.g., dairy). There will be increased 
pressure on our competitors to negotiate preferential trade agreements 
increasing the risk of trade diversion and a general loss of credibility for the 
multilateral trading system. A failure of the Round would also result in increased 
recourse to and pressure on the WTO dispute settlement system and increased 
pressure for countries to abuse SPS measures and other technical regulations to 
keep imports out.  
There will be a general increase in risk and uncertainty in the Canadian 
agricultural business environment with consequent adverse implications for 
investment. Agrifood producers will experience smaller productivity gains as a  
result of continued inability to service new market access opportunities abroad     18
(and to meet increased import pressures at home). Increased trade distortions 
and uncertainty in the  
multilateral trading system 
will discourage investment 
and growth and inhibit 
productivity gains. Canada's 
experience following the 
Canada/US FTA illustrates 
how new access 
opportunities and/or import 
pressure can transform 
sectors. Canadian examples 
include, the massive growth of the greenhouse industry, major new investments 
in world class beef packing plants, and renewal of the grape and wine industry. 
 
5.0 CANADA’S  IMPORT SENSITIVE SECTORS 
The main consequences of a Doha Round failure for Canada's import sensitive 
sectors, primarily the supply managed industries, would be to further delay the 
necessity for these industries to adjust to global pressures for more open markets 
and to rely less on price support policies. In the short-term, a Doha Round failure 
would have limited impacts on the supply managed sectors. The main down side 
would be lower international prices (particularly for dairy) than those that would 
prevail with a Doha Round result. In the medium- to longer-term, the adverse 
consequences would be considerably greater to the extent that the supply 
managed industries’ international competitiveness would continue to 
progressively deteriorate. Further delays will increase the cost of adjustment, 
which will be inevitable at some point, and will increase the competitiveness gap 
between Canadian and foreign producers. In particular, the tendency for the 
benefits of the system to be capitalized into the value of unproductive production 
quotas will continue to increase Canada's costs of production and will exert 
pressure to further increase import protection. This pressure already has been 
manifested in the recent proposals to extend tariff rate quota protection to certain 
milk protein concentrates and to change the federal compositional standards for 
cheese, limiting the use of imported non-traditional dairy ingredients in cheese 
making. 
In short, while older producers, who are close to retirement, may breathe a sigh 
of relief that a Doha Round failure would eliminate, at least for the time being, the 
threat of an imminent reduction in domestic market share and perhaps quota 
values, younger producers will continue to face uncertainty. Given payback times  
Canadian experience following the 
Canada/US FTA illustrates how new access 
opportunities and/or import pressure can 
transform sectors. Think of the subsequent 
massive growth of the greenhouse industry, 
major investments in world class beef 
packing plants, and renewal of the grape 
and wine industry.   19
on loans for quota acquisition that are now around eight to ten years, younger 
producers will have  
to take into account 




could materialize in 
the near term, 
either in the form of 
a delayed Doha 
Round result or as 
a result of a future 
WTO round. 
 
6.0  WHAT IS LOST WITH A DOHA ROUND FAILURE IN AGRICULTURE? 
One consequence of a failed Doha Round would be the loss of the benefits of the 
deal on the table after six years of negotiation. The Chair's draft modalities paper 
of February 2008 provided a good indication of what a final deal would contain. 
Most of the outstanding problems hinge on the "flexibilities" to be permitted in 
market access in order help both developed and developing countries manage 
the more politically sensitive sectors. Although some key numbers are still not 
agreed, it would appear that, if a deal is to be struck, it would contain the 
following elements: 1) elimination of export subsidies; 2) a substantial reduction 
in trade-distorting domestic support; and 3) significantly increased market 
access. Each of these is discussed in more detail below. 
Export Competition  
The potential Doha Round deal, as detailed in the Chair’s paper, would include 
elimination of developed country export subsidies by the end of 2013 and those 
of developing countries by 2016.  New disciplines on food aid, export credits, and 
exporting state trading enterprises would be expected also. 
Domestic Support  
A Doha Round deal would include tiered formulas to reduce overall trade-
distorting domestic support in the EU by about 80 percent, in the US by about 70 
percent, and in most other developed countries by about 60 percent. Countries 
would still have the right to provide unlimited amounts of "green," non-trade-
distorting support but there would be some modest tightening of the green 
criteria. There would also be some constraints on support for individual 
commodities to reduce commodity concentration concerns. 
While older producers may breathe a sigh of relief 
that a Doha Round failure would eliminate the 
threat of an imminent reduction in domestic market 
share and perhaps quota values, younger 
producers will continue to face uncertainty and will 
have to take into account that changes after 2008 
in international trade commitments could arise 
either in the form of a delayed Doha Round result 
or as a result of a future WTO round.   20
The big remaining question on domestic support is the precise level to which US 
total trade-distorting support will be reduced. For its part, the US has made it 
clear that how far it will reduce its trade-distorting support commitment will 
depend on the ambition of the market access result – the bigger the market 
access package, the deeper the US domestic support reductions. 
Market Access  
Under the proposed Doha Round deal, a tiered formula would be the main 
approach for cutting tariffs. Tariffs under 20 percent would be cut by about 50 
percent, tariffs between 20 and 50 percent would be cut by about 60 percent, 
tariffs between 50 and 75 percent would be cut by about 65 percent, and tariffs 
above 75 percent would be cut by about 70 percent. 
There is no question that the market access file is the most difficult politically for 
most countries and thus smaller tariff reductions will be applicable for more 
sensitive commodities. This flexibility would be available to both developed and 
developing countries. In return for being allowed a smaller tariff cut, developed 
countries would have to allow at least some imports at a lower tariff (via a tariff 
rate quota which will expand if a tariff rate quota already exists). The draft 
modalities suggest that sensitive products would be permitted deviations of up to 
two-thirds of the otherwise applicable tariff formula reduction. If the maximum 
deviation of two-thirds was applied to an existing over-quota tariff, the (additional) 
amount entering under the lower in-quota tariff would have to be equivalent to 
about five percent of consumption.  
In the case of the highest over-quota tariffs (those over 75 percent), a sensitive 
product would only be subject to a tariff reduction of about 24 percent, instead of 
a full tariff formula cut of 70 percent. The balancing obligation for being able to 
apply the minimum tariff reduction on the high over-quota tariff would be an 
increase in the quantity entering at the low in-quota tariff. 
The maximum number of tariff lines which would be designated as "sensitive" is 
expected to be around five percent, but countries may be able to designate a 
higher number if they are prepared to "pay" by providing additional low in-quota 
access. For example, instead of having to increase low in-quota access by an 
amount equivalent to about five percent of domestic consumption, the increase 
might be to six percent of consumption if the number of sensitive tariff lines were 
increased to perhaps seven to eight percent of the total number of tariff lines. 
Sensitive product designation will be available to all countries but only developing 
countries will be entitled to designate certain products as "special." This flexibility 
is for food and livelihood security and rural development concerns in developing 
countries. The tariff cuts and maximum number of tariff lines eligible for special 
treatment have yet to be determined but the tariff cuts will be even smaller than 
those applicable to sensitive products.   21
In order to encourage deeper formula tariff cuts there will likely be provision for 
some form of a special agricultural safeguard (at least for developing countries) 
which will permit tariffs to quickly snap-back to at least their pre-Doha Round 
levels if certain price or volume levels are triggered. 
The key question which remains in the market access negotiations is the extent 
to which the tariff reductions inherent in the tiered formula are eroded by the 
various flexibilities provided by the sensitive products, special products and 
special safeguard provisions. As analysts at the World Bank have noted 
(Anderson and Martin), the trade and welfare improvements expected from a 
given tariff reduction formula are very sensitive to the number of exceptions. 
Hence the need for offsetting the smaller tariff cuts for sensitive products with 
additional tariff quota expansion. If the final average cut for all agricultural tariffs 
in developed countries is in the order of 50 percent (with a minimum tariff 
reduction of 24 percent), this will compare very favorably with the 36 percent 
average reduction of the Uruguay Round (with a minimum tariff reduction of 15 
percent). 
While some observers insist that a result along these lines only represents a 
"modest" agricultural result (presumably modest in relation to free trade but who 
realistically expected free trade?), others would argue strongly that, given the 
political sensitivities involved, the overall results represent substantial progress in 
agricultural trade reform –  
a reform which only really 
started with the Uruguay 
Round. Certainly, an 
agreement to finally 
eliminate export subsidies 
and discipline other forms 
of export assistance would 
be major 
accomplishments. 
Similarly, reductions in trade  
distorting domestic support of 60-80 percent in developed countries will provide a 
solid base on which to aim for their complete elimination in the next round and 
would force domestic policy reforms in a number of countries as a consequence 
of implementing such Doha Round results.  
Although it is true that the market access negotiations would still permit very high 
over-quota tariffs for some sensitive products, there would have to be substantial 
improvements in the volumes permitted to enter at relatively low tariffs. Moreover, 
while the reduction commitments for market access and domestic support for 
many developing countries are only two-thirds of that of developed countries (the 
least developed developing countries would not be asked for reductions), 
important policy disciplines would be placed on the agricultural policy options of 
the emerging economies which are the main export growth markets of the future. 
Given the political sensitivities involved, the 
overall results of a successful Doha Round 
would represent substantial progress in 
agricultural trade. Certainly, an agreement 
to finally eliminate export subsidies and 
discipline other forms of export assistance 
would be major accomplishments.    22
In other words, such a deal represents a mixed result, but a result which 
nevertheless means significant and worthwhile progress in the continuum of 
agricultural trade liberalization. 
 
7.0   OPTIONS FOR CANADA 
If the Doha Round negotiations break down completely or are effectively placed 
in the deep freeze for several years, what trade policy options are available to 
Canada and which should be followed? Several, not mutually exclusive options, 
are reviewed below. 
Reliance on the Domestic Market, the Existing NAFTA Market, and a 
Limited Number of Other Preferential Markets 
This option reflects the trade policy status quo plus the completion of planned 
preferential agreements with Korea, CARICOM, and several Latin American 
countries. It is a cautious, reactive trade policy, one which responds to the 
initiatives of others and assumes Canada's existing duty free access to the US 
will continue to be the main trade policy imperative for all sectors of the Canadian 
economy. Under this scenario, agriculture and other natural resource sectors will 
be told that Canada will continue to support the multilateral trading system, but 
the resumption of the Doha Round or the start of a completely new WTO round 
will be something we cannot influence in any meaningful way, so Canada will be 
able to do nothing but wait and see.  
This largely status quo scenario would please the supply managed industries but 
would certainly not please  
the rest of the Canadian 
agrifood sector, which is 
aware that that such a 
scenario would: 1) 
negatively affect the sector’s 
offshore growth 
opportunities; 2) place it  
increasingly at a competitive disadvantage vis à vis those competitors who are 
pursuing more aggressive preferential trade agreement policies; and 3) generally 
retard the growth and competitiveness of any export oriented sectors. At the 
same time, this scenario would continue to allow the international 
competitiveness of the supply managed sectors to deteriorate, particularly 
regarding the cost implications of a continued increase in production quota 
values. 
Maintaining the status quo might please 
the supply managed industries, but the 
rest of the Canadian agrifood sector will 
experience impaired growth and 
competitiveness in international markets.    23
Concentrate on Deepening and Broadening the NAFTA 
While this is a longstanding goal of much of the Canadian business community, 
the unfortunate reality is that there appears to be little current or prospective 
support in the US for expanding and deepening NAFTA, particularly as it applies 
to the US/ Mexico trading relationship. Nevertheless, the US may be interested in 
a very narrow negotiation which is limited, inter alia, to completing the agricultural 
chapter of NAFTA which continues to contain a limited number of exceptions to 
duty free trade. At the time of the Canada/US Free Trade Agreement 
negotiations, the US first insisted on these exceptions, but by the time of the 
NAFTA negotiations, the US pressed for comprehensive free trade in agriculture 
(which it agreed to do with Mexico and which will be fully implemented in 2008). 
In contrast, Canada insisted on continuing to retain tariff rate quotas for supply 
managed products. 
Presumably, under this scenario, Canada would claim that if it (and the US and 
Mexico) agreed to phase out the remaining agricultural tariffs on intra-NAFTA 
trade, this would not be a self-balancing package and Canada would require 
offsetting compensation in other areas. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to delve too deeply into possible trade-off scenarios, it is clear there would be 
massive opposition from the supply managed sectors (and a number of 
provinces) to a phase out of over-quota tariffs which would inevitably mean a 
phase out of supply management and a complete loss of production quota 
values. In contrast, while the US dairy and poultry industries would strongly 
support the progressive elimination of all remaining NAFTA agricultural tariffs, the 
US sugar lobby would not be so supportive. In the absence of tariffs, there would 
be a massive shift of production of sugar containing products to Canada which 
has a sugar policy based on world prices. 
 While the rest of agriculture might welcome this development to the extent that it 
would permit Canada to pursue a much more aggressive trade liberalization 
agenda internationally, the reality would be that the political debate would center 
on the fact that such an option means the end of supply management. While 
economists might argue that the welfare gains for the rest of the economy would 
outweigh the costs to the limited number of current holders of production quotas 
and that it would be possible to cushion the loss of the supply management 
system by a lengthy transition period and appropriate adjustment programs, the 
politics of this scenario are daunting for any Canadian political party, given the 
concentration of dairy and poultry production in Quebec and Ontario and the 
effective political influence of the industry throughout Canada. 
A more limited but more plausible scenario would be for Canada to concentrate 
on limiting any "thickening" of the border as a result of US security concerns 
while intensifying the development of more harmonized technical regulations 
within NAFTA (e.g., pesticide registration, country of origin labeling).   24
Pursue a More Aggressive Preferential Trade Agreement Agenda 
As noted earlier, bilateral or even regional free trade agreements are not suited 
to deal with export assistance and domestic support issues, but they do offer the 
possibility of deeper and faster improvements in market access than multilateral 
negotiations. Unfortunately, the history of most free trade agreements is to treat 
agriculture as a special sector requiring exceptions to the duty free norm. 
Nevertheless, even if most countries regard PTAs as a second best solution, a 
Doha Round failure would reinforce existing pressures in a number of countries 
to pursue preferential arrangements. It would be hard for a Canadian government 
to ignore pleas to level the playing field in the face of existing or new preferential 
agreements by Canada's export competitors in third markets. 
A more aggressive preferential trade agreement agenda could involve actively 
pursuing PTAs with prospective major markets individually (China and India 
especially) or as part of a larger plurilateral initiative, such as the mooted Asia 
Pacific PTA. In some respects, it would be preferable to pursue PTAs on a 
bilateral basis because the negotiating difficulties can be expected to increase 
with the number of participants. On the other hand, it might take a large 
plurilateral PTA to generate the requisite critical mass necessary to launch 
negotiations in the first place. 
The only way to determine what is negotiable on a bilateral or plurilateral basis 
would be to test the waters. But first it would be necessary to prioritize which of 
the potential candidates should be pursued and to examine what Canada would 
be prepared to offer. What Canada could bring to the table would include security 
of supply of a number of resources, but to make this attractive to a country like 
China; it would also likely involve negotiations aimed at minimizing restrictions on 
foreign investment in Canada's resource sectors. Canada would need to examine 
carefully what it would be prepared to offer to make it an attractive preferential 
trading partner to a country like China and why a PTA should be pursued with it, 
as opposed to other potential suitors. 
Aggressively pursuing bilateral agreements would not preclude actively 
encouraging the negotiation of large plurilateral agreements, such as an Asia 
Pacific PTA, which would presumably take longer to negotiate than a bilateral 
deal, given the number of participants and the increased complexities this 
implies. 
Further proliferation of PTAs could very well precipitate calls for the resumption of 
the Doha Round or the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations 
with a broader agenda than the Doha Round. Certainly, countries which find 
themselves on the outside of PTAs will then realize the virtues of a non-
discriminatory trading system. This will be particularly true for the smallest and 
poorest countries.   25
Press for a Re-engagement of the WTO Negotiations 
If the Doha Round negotiations fail to conclude in 2008, then most observers 
think that it will not be possible to conclude a WTO negotiation until 2011 at the 
earliest. This presupposes that a new US administration will obtain Trade 
Promotion Authority in  
2009/10. Following a 
prolonged negotiating hiatus 
it will be difficult to believe a 
new or resumed Round can 
be initiated without a visible 
signal from the US that it is 
ready and willing to negotiate. 
Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that negotiators 
can "freeze" what appeared 
to be on the table in early  
2008 and then simply pick-up where they left off when negotiations resume 
several years later. Nevertheless, if it appears that the Doha Round negotiations 
will not conclude in 2008, it is important for the "friends" of the WTO to press for a 
"managed" disengagement rather than an acrimonious breakdown. This would 
involve Canada working with others to ensure that what is on the table in 2008 
will not be reopened and that efforts are made to conclude the Round as soon as 
the major players, especially the US, are in a position to do so. If instead, the 
Doha Round collapses with no further meetings scheduled, Canada should begin 
the analytical and bridge-building work that will be needed to launch a new 
Round in 2011. A meltdown of the multilateral trading system is something 
Canada should exert every effort to avoid and a new Round which responds to 
the interests and concerns of the WTO membership in the 21st century is the 
best way of ensuring the continued credibility and growth of the multilateral 
trading system. 
 
Under any scenario, if Canada wants to play a more influential role in 
resuscitating and sustaining  
multilateral negotiations, it 
needs to more effectively 
reconcile its agricultural 
trade liberalization goals 
with the political sensitivities 
of supply management. In 
both the Uruguay and Doha  
Round negotiations, Canada's ongoing defensive preoccupations with supply 
management have undermined its credibility and therefore limited its ability to 
influence the negotiations. While regarded as a help to the Doha Round 
negotiations in terms of the ideas it brings to the table in a number of other 
A meltdown of the multilateral trading 
system is something Canada should 
exert every effort to avoid and a new 
Round which responds to the interests 
and concerns of the WTO membership in 
the 21st century is the best way of 
ensuring the continued credibility and 
growth of the multilateral trading system. 
If Canada wants to play a more influential 
role in future WTO negotiations, it needs 
to more effectively reconcile its agricultural 
trade liberalization goals with the political 
sensitivities of supply management.   26
negotiating areas in agriculture, Canada is regarded as part of the problem rather 
than part of the solution when it comes to market access.  
If Canada really wants to retain supply management as a domestic agricultural 
policy tool (which all of the main political parties support), it must articulate how it 
intends to do this in light of the global trend to reduce trade barriers and move 
away from price support policies. However, this is unlikely to occur in a minority 
government context or just before a general election. 
The EU experience in reforming the CAP provides some useful guidance on how 
to approach politically sensitive agricultural policy adjustments. The approach of 
the EU Commission of setting out the challenges and identifying possible ways to 
meet these challenges in a white paper before entering into detailed 
consultations with all stakeholders (producers, processors, and EU member 
states) has enabled the CAP to evolve so that it is much more compatible with an 
open trading system. If such an approach were tried in Canada, it would require 
the wholehearted support and cooperation of the provinces, given their pivotal 
role in supply management. 
One option Canada could try would be to prepare a white paper which outlines 
why the best way to ensure the continuation of supply management for the 
foreseeable future is to identify  
how it can co-exist with a WTO 
outcome incorporating Doha 
Round-like results, that is, 
modest reductions in over-quota 
tariffs and increases in the in-
quota volumes to five to eight 
percent of consumption. This 
paper would also need to outline 
the kinds of adjustment programs 
that would enable supply 
managed sectors to smoothly 
adjust to a trading environment 
based on a Doha Round result.  
Such an initiative would require considerable political courage, but the alternative 
of repeating the Uruguay and Doha Round negotiating positions is a recipe for 
having to accept what the rest of the international community has negotiated at 
the end of the day. The option of Canada walking away from a WTO Round over 
a refusal to marginally reduce over-quota tariffs and to provide expanded in-
quota volumes is not credible, domestically or internationally.  
The focus of the supply management/trade policy conundrum needs to be shifted 
away from the two extremes of maintaining the status quo or eliminating supply 
management to a more centrist, pragmatic approach which recognizes the 
A white paper outlining how supply 
management can co-exist with a WTO 
outcome incorporating modest 
reductions in over-quota tariffs and 
increases in the in-quota volumes 
would need to outline adjustment 
programs that would enable supply 
managed sectors to adjust to a 
trading environment based on a Doha 
Round result.    27
political realities of Canadian public policy. Hopefully, an informed debate arising 
from a realistic white paper would allow for the development of a viable game 
plan for the future of supply management, while permitting Canada to pursue an 
aggressive and credible trade policy aimed at concluding either a new or 
resumed Doha Round. 
 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Canadian agricultural policy-makers need to recognize that suspension or failure 
of the Doha Round negotiations in 2008 would not mean the end of multilateral 
negotiations and that a more likely scenario would include the resumption of the 
negotiations or the start of a new Round within the next several years. 
Preferential trade agreements are expected to continue to proliferate but are not 
a substitute for multilateral agricultural trade reform, especially for smaller 
countries like Canada. The bottom line is that the external trade policy 
environment will continue to condition and constrain Canada's agricultural policy 
options. In other words, the domestic policy status quo will continue to be under 
pressure to adapt to a more open and less distorted trading system.  
None of the four options explored above are mutually exclusive. In practice, 
elements of each of the four can be pursued concurrently, although the prospects 
for making major changes to the agricultural provisions of the NAFTA may be 
problematic at this juncture. There does not appear to be any compelling reason 
why Canada could not pursue a more aggressive multilateral policy, provided a 
way can be found to manage the politics of supply management. Even a more 
aggressive preferential trade agreement option can be expected to run into the 
supply management wall at some point.  
The option of maintaining the supply management status quo is a recipe for 
being forced to accept  
sooner or later what 
others have negotiated. 
Canada must extricate 
itself from this trade 
policy blind alley. In 
order to do this, Canada  
will have to develop a supply management game plan which allows it to gradually 
reduce its border protection while permitting producers to benefit from the 
stability and security provided by a more market responsive supply management 
system. 
 
It is easy to forget that agricultural trade reform is a means to an end, not an end 
in itself. For Canada, the main reason why a rules-based, more open and less 
distorted multilateral trading  system should continue to be an overriding goal is 
The option of maintaining the supply 
management status quo is a recipe for being 
forced to accept sooner or later what others 
have negotiated.   28
that it provides the best opportunity for ensuring a more sustainable, more 
competitive agricultural  
economy for all regions of 
Canada. Pursuit of new 
preferential trade agreements 
in a post-NAFTA world is 
largely a defensive response to 
the initiatives of others and for 
this reason will undoubtedly 
need to be pursued. However, 
for an agricultural trading 
country such as Canada, 
multilateral trade reform should 
be paramount and Canada  
should position itself so it can more effectively help influence and shape the 
future of the international trading system. The alternative is to be swept along by 
the current of globalization, whether we like it or not. 
If Canada is to pursue a more aggressive position in support of a strengthened 
multilateral agricultural trading system, it must be seen to be willing to put its own 
house in order if it is to have any credibility internationally. Provided this can be 
demonstrated, Canada is in a better position to assert a leadership role in 
working with other like-minded countries in the Cairns Group and the G-20 to 
conclude the next leg in agricultural trade reform. 
Clearly there are limits to what a medium-sized trading country can accomplish in 
influencing the future shape of the agricultural trading system. Moreover, as 
increasing numbers of developing countries grow to the point where they begin to 
play more active roles in the WTO, the number of potential influential players has 
increased. Nevertheless, Canada has demonstrated in the past that it can 
effectively punch above its weight and has the potential to continue to play an 
influential role in the WTO. The challenge will be to position itself so that it can 
fully exploit this potential – a task which will require a comprehensive and 
credible negotiating position on agriculture. The alternative is to continue to 
muddle through and hope that problems will become more manageable if 
decisions are delayed long enough. 
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APPENDIX  I: WHY MIGHT THE DOHA ROUND FAIL? 
There are a number of factors working against a successful Doha Round 
conclusion. Several of these affect the linkages and trade-offs between the main 
elements of the Doha Round negotiating agenda, particularly agriculture, non-
agricultural market access (NAMA), services, and rules. For most of the past six 
years, the negotiating difficulties in agriculture were regarded as the main 
constraint to concluding the Doha Round. However, in recent months, as the 
shape of the agricultural package became clearer, it has become apparent that 
there are also major obstacles to be overcome elsewhere in the negotiations; 
especially in NAMA. 
Some of the factors which have influenced the pace and the level of ambition of 
the negotiations include: 1) the problem of applied versus bound tariffs; 2) limited 
pressure from non-agricultural interests in governments; 3) US internal support 
for agricultural trade reform is weaker than it was in the Uruguay Round; 4)  the 
increased negotiating leverage of developing countries; 5) differing interests 
among developing countries; and 6) expanding WTO membership makes 
negotiations more complex and difficult. These are each discussed below. 
The Problem of Applied versus Bound Tariffs 
Developing countries were told this was to be the "Doha Development Round" 
which implied that their interests and concerns would be front and centre in the 
negotiations, particularly as regards agriculture. In contrast, the developed 
countries expected that, although there would be special and differential 
treatment for developing countries – mainly in the form of lower reduction 
commitments, this would not prevent substantial improvements in market access 
for both agricultural and non-agricultural products. However, few recognized at 
the beginning how difficult it would be to reconcile these expectations. The 
problem is that most developing countries (India and Brazil for example) have 
applied tariffs which are substantially below their bound rates (and which form the 
agreed baseline from which to negotiate tariff reductions). This so-called "water 
in the tariff" gives these countries complete policy flexibility to increase applied 
tariffs up to the bound ceiling level overnight. In contrast, the applied rate is 
identical to the bound rate for virtually all tariffs in developed countries and China 
as well. This means that it is very difficult for any tariff formula to bring developing 
country bound tariffs below the applied level without requiring a linear tariff 
reduction which is greater than that applied to developed countries. However, for 
agricultural exporters (developing as well as developed) a major goal in the Doha 
Round was to improve access to the rapidly growing emerging markets of the 
developing world.    32
Limited Pressure from Non-agricultural Interests on Governments 
Agreement on the part of the developing countries to launch the Doha Round 
was conditional on a narrow negotiating agenda which concentrated on the 
"unfinished business" of agriculture and the remaining tariff peaks on 
manufactured products in developed countries. Attempts by some developed 
countries (in particular the EU) to broaden the agenda to increase support for 
potential trade-offs were rebuffed and as a result the pressure on governments 
from non-agricultural interests to conclude the Doha Round is not as broad, or as 
deep as it was in the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, a number of issues have 
been successfully negotiated on a sectoral basis after the Uruguay Round (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals and information technology), which has further reduced the 
potential number of interest groups exerting pressure on governments to 
conclude the Doha Round. 
In other words, the Doha Round is concentrated on overcoming the toughest 
defenders of the status quo in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors while 
having relatively fewer champions of freer trade to counteract this defensive 
pressure. In Canada, for example, the non-agricultural champions of freer trade 
have been virtually invisible (many are of the view that NAFTA has largely 
addressed their trade interests). With minimal pressure for an ambitious Doha 
Round result from non-agricultural interests, the agricultural exporters have been 
effectively neutered by the political power of the import sensitive supply managed 
sectors. 
US Internal Support for Agricultural Trade Reform Is Weaker than it Was in 
the Uruguay Round  
Many US agricultural export interests (which were disappointed that the Uruguay 
Round results did not live up to their hype) are aware that the major beneficiaries 
of agricultural trade liberalization would be low cost producers such as Brazil, 
Argentina, New Zealand, and Australia – countries whose land values do not 
reflect the benefits of farm programs, but rather what the market will return. US 
agriculture’s interest in further trade liberalization has also been eroded by the 
fixation on biofuels and the conviction that the political energy spent on promoting 
and defending biofuel policies will pay a better economic dividend than 
multilateral trade policy. Compounding the situation has been a failure, at least 
until relatively recently, of the US Administration to explain to US producers that 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support can be replaced in part or in 
whole by green support. 
The end result is that US agriculture’s support for the Doha Round is 
considerably softer than it was for the Uruguay Round where it can be argued 
that the single-minded determination of the US to bring agriculture under 
operationally effective international rules and disciplines was mainly responsible 
for the advances that were made.   33
The Increased Negotiating Leverage of Developing Countries 
The dramatically increased influence of developing countries, especially the large 
emerging economies, within the WTO has meant that the US and the EU can no 
longer ram through the results of their bilateral negotiations on a take it or leave it 
basis. While it is true that the Cairns Group of developed and developing 
agricultural exporters can claim much of the credit for ensuring the Uruguay 
Round got off to a good start on agriculture, with many of its ideas incorporated 
into the final Agreement on Agriculture, the end-game negotiations (Blair House 
and subsequently) were completely dominated by the two economic 
superpowers. 
In the Doha Round, Brazil and India together with the other members of the G-20 
group of developing countries have demonstrated a capacity to generate 
proposals which have been incorporated into the Chair's modalities paper along 
with the leverage necessary to reject US/EU accommodations which do not 
reflect their interests. In particular, the G-20 has made it clear that their 
willingness to move on NAMA will depend upon the progress they make in 
agriculture. For the G-20 developing countries, the magnitude of the reduction of 
US trade-distorting domestic support has become their main barometer of 
agricultural trade reform. 
The upshot of this is that while the G-20 has managed to keep the level of 
ambition in the agricultural negotiations higher than it would be if the US and the 
EU had been left free to conclude and push through another "Blair House" 
bilateral deal, the unwillingness of the large emerging economies to meet the 
market access aspirations of the developed countries on non-agricultural tariffs 
has become a major stumbling block. 
Differing Interests among Developing Countries 
It is important to point out that the interests of the developing countries are not 
homogeneous. Many developing countries are more concerned about reducing 
their non-agricultural tariffs because of anticipated competition from China than 
they are about import competition from developed countries. Similarly, in 
agricultural market access, many developing countries are just as concerned 
about import competition from highly efficient developing country exporters, such 
as Brazil or Malaysia as they are with import competition from developed country 
exporters. This is particularly true for countries with a large number of 
subsistence farmers who often coexist with a much smaller number of larger-
scale commercial farmers. In countries like India, China, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, the ability to continue to shield their vulnerable subsistence farmers 
from import competition is viewed as a political imperative. Hence, their 
insistence on small or no tariff cuts on "special products."   34
Expanding WTO Membership Makes Negotiations More Complex and 
Difficult 
The increasing size of the WTO (over 150 members) and its current institutional 
structure (based on consensus rather than a majority vote) have been cited 
among the reasons why the conclusion of the multilateral negotiations has 
become so difficult and protracted. 
Considered in isolation, none of these factors would be sufficient to prevent the 
Doha Round from concluding, but their cumulative effects so far have been 
sufficient to blunt any attempt to bring the negotiations to a successful 
conclusion.   35
APPENDIX II: WHY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT CAN CO-EXIST WITH THE 
PROSPECTIVE DOHA ROUND RESULT 
The Canadian supply management system could continue to function under the 
prospective Doha Round result. The main change the industry would face would 
likely be the replacement of the present pricing system in dairy and eggs with a 
system of negotiated prices between producers and processors (paralleling the 
existing situation for chickens and turkeys) which still would reflect very 
substantial protection via the remaining over-quota tariffs. The main adjustment 
would be that Canadian producer prices would start to more closely track world 
prices which should be less volatile and higher as a result of the phase out of 
export subsidies and the creation of new market access opportunities. The 
impact of a Doha Round result on the production quota values created by supply 
management is hard to judge and would depend heavily on the adjustment 
policies adopted by the Canadian federal and provincial governments chosen to 
facilitate a “soft” rather than a “hard” landing for producers. Given the political 
influence of the supply managed industry at both the federal and provincial level, 
it would appear safe to assume that every effort would be made to assure a soft 
landing and a continuation of most of the main elements of the supply 
management system. 
Increased import competition from a Doha Round result would impact the supply 
managed sectors in different ways. The greatest impacts would be expected for 
dairy, turkey, and egg producers, while the impacts on producers of chicken and 
broiler hatching eggs and chicks should be considerably less, reflecting the fact 
that for these latter products Canada's NAFTA market access obligations already 
provide considerably more low in-quota tariff access than Canada's existing WTO 
commitments. For example, Canada is obliged, under NAFTA, to provide low 
duty access for chicken equivalent to 7.5 per cent of the previous year's 
production. This compares to Canada's existing WTO commitment to provide low 
duty access for an amount equivalent to five percent of consumption in the 1986-
88 period. Given that Canadian broiler production has grown considerably since 
then, this means that the NAFTA rather than Canada’s WTO commitment is the 
binding import access obligation. In the case of broiler hatching eggs there would 
be no new market access under a Doha Round Agreement since Canada's 
existing NAFTA access obligation (21.1 percent of the anticipated current year's 
production) already greatly exceeds its current and prospective WTO obligations. 
The situation for dairy, turkey, and eggs would differ in that much of the increase 
in WTO quota volumes would represent new access. However, even for these 
products, the actual import increase will be moderated by the fact that in a 
number of cases the supplementary import permit system already allows in more 
imports than the current WTO commitment levels (however,  it would not be 
permitted to count imports for re-export against in-quota obligations).   36
The upshot is that a Doha Round outcome along the lines of the Chair's draft 
modalities would imply that Canada will need to increase the volume of WTO in-
quota imports to something in the order of five to eight percent of domestic 
consumption in exchange for only having to reduce its 200-300 percent over-
quota tariffs by less than one-quarter (instead of around 70 percent if there was a 
full application of the tiered tariff reduction formula). Thus, the remaining over-
quota tariffs still should be high enough to allow a slightly modified supply 
management system to survive 
The most vulnerable sector, dairy, would still retain sufficiently high over-quota 
tariffs to enable it to compete against low cost suppliers, such as New Zealand 
and Australia – even if the US dollar continues to be depressed relative to other 
currencies. However, Canadian supply managed prices would have to 
increasingly reflect the landed, duty paid cost of imports. This would mean less 
price stability than that provided by a fully insulated administered pricing system. 
Moreover, to the extent that a Doha Round result would contain caps on trade-
distorting domestic support, any remaining administered prices would be subject 
to a cap and roll-back to the average prevailing in the 1995-2000 period – which, 
in effect means a move to negotiated pricing. 
On the export side, a Doha Round export subsidy phase out would force a 
parallel phase out of Canadian supplied managed exports priced at below the 
administered domestic price, particularly in dairy. Dairy product exports would 
virtually cease, but processed food exports incorporating dairy products could 
continue, provided the milk used was priced the same, irrespective of whether 
the processed food was exported or sold on the domestic market (as is already 
the case for milk sold for the manufacture of chocolate confectionaries). 
As noted earlier, the precise impact on the value of production quotas for dairy 
(by far the most important supply managed sector) of a Doha Round result is 
difficult to predict. Currently, strong international dairy product prices, reinforced 
by the Doha Round results, will make it more difficult for imports to enter Canada 
even over reduced over-quota tariffs and this will help moderate the impact of 
increased import access into the Canadian market. The only thing which appears 
sure is that asset values could fall more than necessary; unless the adjustment 
game plan is known early, all stakeholders are given time to adjust, and 
appropriate adjustment assistance is provided. The manner in which the EU has 
managed its reform of the Common Agricultural Policy demonstrates that even 
the most politically sensitive policies (e.g., EU sugar and grains) can be modified 
to make them compatible with a more open trading system. 
Questions of political influence aside, there are valid reasons why governments 
need to consider adjustment assistance. Most current supply managed producers 
had to purchase their production quota and make other long-term investments in 
the context of an ongoing supply management system. These investments were 
made in good faith on the basis of long-standing policies supported by virtually all   37
political parties at both the federal and provincial levels. If the rules of the game 
are to be changed as a result of a multilateral trade agreement, it is only fair that 
governments provide appropriate financial adjustment assistance. 